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BUMPER CARS: THEMES OF CONVERGENCE
IN INTERNATIONAL REGULATION*
MICHAEL P. MALLOY**
In this Article, Professor Malloy examines the convergence of regulatory stan-
dards among international regulators, suggesting that the dynamic of financial
services regulation can best be understood as a conceptualized version of the
bumper cars ride at an amusement park While Professor Malloy suggests that a
certain degree of convergence has already occurred in international regulation,
thus decreasing the number of "bumps" in the ride, he also recognizes that much
of this convergence remains prospective rather than actual, and currently is domi-
nated by a pattern of regionalized regulation. Professor Malloy argues that, un-
less a converged pattern of regulation continues to develop, the now-
internationalized field offinancial services will remain an arena in which large,
but still uncoordinated, regionalized bumper cars carom and collide.
N my brief remarks, I hope to identify a gradual historical progression
towards greater convergence of regulatory standards among interna-
tional regulators-particularly bank regulators-and also to suggest that
this convergence is slow and fragile and needs to be better understood.
Underlying my discussion is the assumption that, as a matter of fact, the
change in the contours of our financial markets is directed towards in-
creasing "internationalization," whatever that concept may be taken to
mean.' If this is so, however, then internationalization must be consid-
* An early draft of this presentation was delivered before the Columbus
Quincentenary Committee Conference of the International Association of Jurists Italy-
U.S.A. at the Palazzo Rondanini, Rome, 22 September 1988. The current version of this
presentation was delivered on October 17, 1991, at the 1991-1992 Graduate Colloquium
of the Fordham University School of Law Graduate Program, entitled "Transnational
Financial Services in the 1990s." The Graduate Colloquium is a facility established by
the Graduate Program for the examination of current legal issues in areas of particular
interest to the Law School's LL.M. programs (I.e-, Banking, Corporate and Finance Law,
and International Business and Trade Law). The Colloquium is a forum for periodic,
formal presentations, throughout the academic year, by scholars, government leaders,
and recognized leaders in practice on current issues in those areas.
** Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Studies, Fordham University School
of Law; B.A.; Georgetown University (1973); J.D., University of Pennsylvania (1976);
Ph.D., Georgetown University (1983). The author wishes to thank Dean John D. Feer-
ick and Professor Michael M. Martin, Faculty Adviser to the Fordham Law Review, for
their support and encouragement of the Graduate Colloquium. The author acknowl-
edges the invaluable assistance of Mrs. Estelle Fabian, Assistant Director (Administra-
tion) of the Graduate Program, and the Graduate Program Staff, without whom nothing
ever happens.
1. What "internationalization" (or "globalization" or "transnationalization")
means, in terms significant to regulatory policy, is a subject requiring further study. See
Staff of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Report to the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce Concerning Internationalization of the Securities Markets (1987) (analyz-
ing implications of "internationalization" for United States securities regulation) [herein-
after SEC Staff Study Concerning the Internationalization of the Securities Markets]. See
generally Malloy, Internationalization of the Securities Markets, 12 Md. J. Int'l L. &
Trade 103 (1987) (reviewing the SEC Staff Study).
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ered not just in terms of the size and character of those markets, but also
in terms of the manner in which they should be regulated.
In addition, I intend in the course of this discussion to suggest certain
themes of convergence that may be operating in international regulation.
These are: (1) that a loose institutional framework for the regulation of
the international financial environment currently exists;2 (2) that a coa-
lescence is occurring among individual financial markets into an interna-
tionalized set of markets; and (3) that a framework of regional
cooperation is expanding that may ground the process of
internationalization. 3
It is my suspicion, however, that the regulation of financial services
remains-for the most part-a dynamic of individual, domestic systems
of regulation that interact in various ways transnationally. The nature of
these interactions is such that convergence of regulatory standards may
be impeded, to the detriment of the internationalized markets. Accord-
ingly, in my remarks I shall first examine the dynamic of financial serv-
ices regulation.4 Second, to track the direction of change in the financial
markets, I shall review briefly the historical roots of current United
States banking regulation.5 Third, I shall offer some contemporary ex-
amples of the growing need for coordination and internationalization in
financial services regulation.6 Finally, I conclude that, while the factual
predicates of internationalization have clearly proceeded in their devel-
opment, the convergence of regulatory standards capable of dealing with
an internationalized financial services environment has lagged. In large
part, this delay is due to the use of a sometimes inappropriate dynamic of
regulation in an increasingly internationalized context.7
I. THE DYNAMIC OF FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION: THE
BUMPER CARS THEORY
I suggest that the dynamic of financial services regulation may be best
understood as a conceptualized version of a bumper cars ride at an
amusement park. I believe that this conceptual framework explains
many of the tensions and accommodations that have been exhibited in
recent years by financial services regulation in the internationalized
environment.
2. See Wegen, Transnational Financial Services-Current Challenges for an Inte-
grated Europe, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational
Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S91, 92-94 (1992) (discussing inter-
national institutions and groups involved in financial services regulation).
3. See Note, Banking on Europe: 1992 and EMU, in Annual Survey of Financial
Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham
L. Rev. S395, S395-428 (1992) (discussing developments in convergence of standards
within the European Community).
4. See infra notes 8-21 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 27-50 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 60
THEMES OF CONVERGENCE
For anyone who has not recently visited an amusement park, or who
customarily avoids such high-impact rides as bumper cars, the following
basic description may be helpful. Bumper cars are squat, round single-
or double-seat cars with disproportionately large rubber bumpers. Typi-
cally, each car is attached by a long, vertical pole to a source of power
and to a tracking mechanism that guides the car's movement. The indi-
vidual cars have steering wheels but, in practice, these tend to have little
or no effect on the direction in which the car will travel.
As soon as the patrons are seated in their cars and the power is turned
on, the cars carom around the enclosed space in which the cars are situ-
ated, bumping into each other apparently at random and with increasing
frequency and power, with the result that the direction, speed, and civil-
ity of each car's ride becomes more unpredictable as the amusement ride
proceeds. It is possible, of course, for an individual patron to influence
the direction and degree of impact of his or her car by the application of
simple principles of physics-namely, by "shoving" oneself forward, typ-
ically in the moment prior to likely impact with another car, to increase
the degree of impact and the likely consequent rebound. Nevertheless,
looking at the bumper cars ride as a total system, there is no apparent
object or rational pattern to its activity.'
I submit that, to the extent that the domestic regulation of financial
services proceeds without specific reference to the broader international
environment, its dynamic is not unlike that of the bumper cars amuse-
ment ride. The impact of the domestic system with other, foreign sys-
tems of regulation of activity primarily taking place in those other
jurisdictions appears to be at random, and the severity of the impact on
the domestic system is likewise a matter of chance. It is true that basic,
traditional principles of private international law-for instance, conflict
of laws rules,9 jurisdiction-preference rules such as those contained in the
two Restatements of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,"
and the like-may moderate the severity of the impact. Nevertheless,
these principles tend to be no more than extrinsic rules governing the
operation of the legal amusement park in general, rather than specific,
substantive rules of conduct crafted for the particular ride. In the ab-
sence of such substantive rules, regulatory systems simply continue to
collide, with increasing frequency and severity of impact as the level of
internationalized activity rises.
8. Whether such apparently random movements within a defined field do neverthe-
less constitute a purposeful system is the subject of some dispute. See D.R. Hofstadter,
Gidel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid 37 (1980) (noting the difficulty of perceiv-
ing a system not previously recognized).
9. See North, Reform, But Not Revolution, in 220:1 Hague Aead. Recueil des Cours
154-76 (1990) (discussing the general course of private international law and choice of law
principles in the context of contracts).
10. Compare Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 3, 18-19 (1965) with
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 401-03, 431 (1987) (concerning types
of jurisdiction, as well as jurisdiction to prescribe and to enforce laws).
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Assuming little or no internationalized activity, the "dynamic" of fi-
nancial services regulation would resemble a bumper car enclosure before
the ride is activated, as shown in Illustration 1. There may be considera-
ble movement and activity within each individual car, as each regulator
fidgets with the domestic regulated entities, but little or no activity or
impact occurs across the field as a whole.
What would happen when the amusement ride is activated-that is,
once a significant degree of transnational, but domestically regulated, ac-
tivity begins to occur? With no adjustment or accommodation for the
transnational nature of this activity by or among the individual national
regulators, one would achieve the very model of the modern bumper cars
ride, as is pictured in Illustration 2. Of course, in practice, it is unlikely
that this degree of raw impact between systems would occur without
some accommodation, if only on a case-by-case basis."1
It is the very image of this full-tilt bumper car activity that causes
regulators, and regulated participants as well, to seek to avoid overlap or
contact with other regulatory systems. One traditional response found in
securities practice is the phenomenon of "clustering," displayed in Illus-
tration 3. Fearing the full disclosure, apparent complexity, and supposed
high cost of the United States securities regulation regime, many non-
U.S. participants simply cluster their securities offerings outside the
United States, making a concerted effort to avoid impact with the United
States securities market. 12 To the extent that techniques like clustering
are effective, they have the effect of excluding the target of clustering-
here, the United States and U.S. investors-from the game altogether. If
the stakes in the game begin to rise, and it becomes important to the
excluded player to obtain entry, then it is not unlikely that the excluded
player may seek to moderate its perceived potential impact (perhaps by
agreeing to a "no-shoving" rule). In fact, as transnational capital forma-
tion has become more important, this is precisely what the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") has done in moderating the impact of
the United States securities laws on foreign-based participants in the
11. See Honegger, Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and Illumination of
the United States-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding, 9 N.C. J. Int'l & Com. Reg. 1, 9-
13, 17-24 (1983) (discussing the relatively ad hoc resolution of the conflict between the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Swiss banking industry over confidentiality
of banking records relevant to United States securities enforcement investigations).
12. See 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306 (1990) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 200); 55 Fed. Reg.
18,308 (1990) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230); Note, Increasing United States Invest-
ment in Foreign Securities" An Evaluation of SEC Rule 144A, in Annual Survey of Finan-
cial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60
Fordham L. Rev. S179, S183-86 (1992) (discussing hesitancy of foreign offerors of securi-
ties to use United States securities markets and the use of Rule 144A to attract foreign
offerors through relaxed disclosure requirements) [hereinafter Note, Increasing U.S. In-
vestment]; Note, The SEC's Proposed Regulations of Foreign Securities Issued in the
United States, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational
Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S203 (1992) (providing a more
generalized discussion of the same) [hereinafter Note, Proposed Regulations].
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market,' 3 while retaining the right to use certain basic "bumpers," like
the anti-fraud rules. 4
An alternative approach may suggest itself within certain sub-fields of
the playing area of the bumper cars ride-specifically, through consolida-
tion or regionalization of the rules of the game. This strategy has the
effect of creating a multi-passenger bumper car, in which four or five or
more players (Le., individual regulators or national regulatory systems)
may ride together. There are, of course, at least two possible advantages
to this approach. First, the approach almost completely eliminates the
possibility of collision between any of the regulatory systems now consol-
idated into the one regulatory bumper car. 15 Second, it gives the consoli-
dated bumper car more "throw-weight" in any collision with other
individual bumper cars, thus increasing the likelihood that the impact on
the consolidated system will be minimalized. In many areas, most nota-
bly in the securities field, 6 the European Community is harmonizing reg-
ulatory rules and is in fact building a bigger bumper car to secure these
advantages. Similarly, one could argue that the decision in 1933 and
1934 to create a system of federal securities regulation within the United
States 17 in effect resulted in the construction of a bigger bumper car,
although the contemporary motivation for this effort was not specifically
directed at the advantages of a bigger car.
The prospect of two such consolidated bumper cars, as pictured in
Illustration 4, nevertheless raises its own set of problems. With these two
behemoths potentially caroming around the track, serious dangers for
other bumper car drivers still exist. More to the point, however, these
two large vehicles may be sufficiently well-matched that they would mu-
tually neutralize the second advantage of consolidation-minimizing the
relative seriousness of impact with other cars-in any collision between
13. See, e.g., Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in an Inter-
nationalized Marketplace, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation,
Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S77 (1992) (discuss-
ing SEC initiatives with respect to foreign-based participants); Note, Increasing U.S. In-
vestment, supra note 12, at S182-87 (same); Note, Proposed Regulations, supra note 12, at
S211-15 (same).
14. 55 Fed. Reg. 18,308.
15. The consolidation approach does not, of course, eliminate the possibility of colli-
sion due to intra-system variance with respect to specific regulatory rules, if the terms of
the consolidation still give a degree of individual competence and discretion to the indi-
vidual regulators. This has occurred, for example, in the case of coordinated rules with
respect to capital adequacy. See infra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing dissent
over specific features of capital adequacy rules). This may also occur with respect to the
regulation of banking within the European Community under the Second Banking Direc-
tive, see Wegen, supra note 2, at 593, although that remains to be seen, once the directive
is fully operative.
16. See Goebel, Remarks, in Malloy, Internationalization of the Securities Markets,
1988 Proceedings Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 299-305 (discussing EC directives on harmonization
of securities disclosure rules).
17. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1988); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.
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the two. This prospect, in fact, has increased the need for accommoda-
tion between the two systems in the future.
An alternative sub-field response to the bumper cars phenomenon is to
reach specialized, bilateral accommodation on mutually perceived prob-
lem areas in substantive regulation. This was done, in effect, when
United States and United Kingdom regulatory authorities agreed in prin-
ciple on rules governing capital adequacy assessment for banks in early
1987.18 This has also been done by the SEC, on a country-by-country
basis, in negotiating enforcement "Memoranda of Understanding"
("MOUs").1 9 While such a bilateral approach might rationalize the reg-
ulatory treatment of transnational competitors subject respectively to the
two authorities-thus reducing the regulatory competitive disadvantage
between them-it does not work well in a field in which significant com-
petition occurs across a broader transnational spectrum, as indicated in
Illustration 5.
To the extent that significant players are not included in the bilateral
arrangement, the ultimate effect on the market participants subject to the
arrangement may be extremely negative. The two systems are bound to
the extent of their shared substantive rules, and are mutually affected by
the impact of collision with other bumper cars. In a concrete case, for
example, tying United States and British banks to significant capital ade-
quacy requirements-and the costs to banks attendant on such rules-
exacerbates the impact of competition with Japanese banks that might be
subject to more favorable capital adequacy requirements. At the same
time, the bilateralized regulatory regimes would lack the independent
discretion to respond to such impact.
The bilateral approach has therefore not often worked as an independ-
ent response, although it may be effective as a first step or prelude to a
broader coordinated response. This has been the case, in fact, in the area
of capital adequacy supervision, where the United States-United King-
dom arrangement was quickly replaced by a multilateral response, in-
cluding Japan, the other members of the Group of Ten ("G-10"),2° and
Luxembourg and Switzerland under the aegis of the Committee on Bank-
ing Regulations and Supervisory Practices of the Bank for International
18. See Agreed Proposal of the United States Federal Banking Supervisory Authori-
ties and the Bank of England on Primary Capital and Capital Adequacy Assessment,
reprinted in 3 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 33,151 (Feb. 27, 1987); see also Malloy,
U.S. International Banking and the New Capital Adequacy Requirements: New, Old and
Unexpected, 7 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 75, 88-105 (1988) (discussing the joint proposal
between the United States and the United Kingdom).
19. See Doty, supra note 13, at S83-84 (discussing the use of MOUs); see also Honeg-
ger, supra note 11, at 21-24 (discussing the United States-Swiss MOU).
20. The Group of Ten is a group of industrialized western democracies that offer
primary support to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) located in Basle, Swit-
zerland. The Group consists of: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Malloy, supra
note 18, at 77 n.13.
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Settlements ("BIS").2" In effect, this multilateral response has managed
to create a converged pattern of regulation-as seen in Illustration 6-
among all significant bumper cars in this particular game. I would argue
that it is only such a converged pattern that can eliminate the vagaries
and dangers of the bumper cars phenomenon.
II. THE HISTORICAL RooTs OF UNITED STATES BANKING
REGULATION AND THE NEED FOR CONVERGENCE
International coordination of regulatory supervision is needed, not be-
cause of an abstract desire for symmetry, but because domestic regula-
tion of financial services cannot, as a practical matter, be truly effective
unless it is coordinated with the efforts of other members of the interna-
tional community. Similarly, convergence of international regulatory
standards is not needed to satisfy an abstract need for harmony, but
rather because gratuitous variations among national standards create in-
efficiencies and inequities among participants in the same set of interna-
tional markets.
At least for United States banking regulation, the development of con-
vergent standards raises special problems because historically our regula-
tory system has itself been radically divergent at the domestic level.2"
Following the rise of the Jacksonian coalition in 1828, no serious attempt
at rationalizing United States banking regulation occurred until the crisis
created by the Civil War. Thus, it was a major military crisis that
prompted the first significant step forward in the development of bank
regulation in the modern period. The war required not only guns and
men to carry them, but money (or credit) to pay for them. Part of the
solution to the credit problems of waging the war has outlasted the crisis
itself, and has become one of the central features of the contemporary
United States bank regulatory system-namely, the passage of the Na-
tional Bank Act of 1864, which authorized federal chartering of national
banks.23
Until the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, the National
Bank Act was the nation's most important banking code, although the
competition from state bank chartering systems continued, as it has to
this day. Thus, the very creation of a "national" banking system was, in
the first instance, a matter of expediency. To the extent that the federal
21. See id. at 112-21 (discussing the BIS initiative).
22. See Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 715 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (illustrating the divergence among state and federal approaches to admission of
foreign bank branches into the domestic markets). The radical divergence has been in-
creasingly mitigated in recent years by a significant increase in pervasive federal regula-
tion of financial services, particularly in the banking and securities sectors. See Malloy,
Seeing the Light: Savings Association Conversions and Federal Regulatory Realignment,
10 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 189, 221-24 (1991) (arguing that pervasive federal regulation of
depository institutions has effected significant regulatory realignment of this sector).
23. See 2 Documentary History of Banking and Currency in the United States 1261-
65 (H.E. Krooss ed. 1969).
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legislation did nothing to eliminate or otherwise absorb the state banking
systems, their continued existence was simply a matter of practical fact
and not policy.24 For this reason, the bifurcation of the United States
banking system has continued to this day.
In the literal sense, a national banking system was created by the en-
actment of the National Bank Act; that is to say, authority was granted
to the executive to charter private banking corporations that were sub-
ject, to a significant degree, to federal law in their corporate structure,
powers to do business, and the like. In a broader sense, however, a truly
national banking system surely entailed more than the mere participa-
tion by the federal government as another incorporator of banks compet-
ing with the states. A consistent and coherent national policy for the
regulation of banking would seem to be implied in the notion of a "na-
tional" banking system. In fact, the United States has been slow to
achieve any such policy. Nor is it likely that complete consistency and
coherence probably will be achieved under present circumstances, 25 due
to two basic factors. First, our banking system is as federal as our system
of government. Second, the entities subject to regulation in the United
States, and the number of federal and state regulators, are almost irra-
tionally diverse in character. This may in part explain why a significant
American presence in international banking really did not emerge until
the post-World War I period.26
III. THE GROWING NEED FOR CONVERGENCE: SOME
CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES
In any event, banking has had a long history and, from early on, inter-
national banking has been a continuing focal point in that history.27
Nevertheless, it required a series of fundamental crises in our century to
move developments along the paths of international coordination and
convergence.
European financial institutions have operated transnationally for cen-
turies, led by the Italian banks from the Twelfth through the Sixteenth
centuries. As colonial adventures arose and were fueled by the promise
of broadened international trade, British, Dutch, Belgian, and (later)
German financial institutions expanded throughout the world. Ameri-
cans followed only belatedly and did not fully emerge into the interna-
tional market until this century.
24. The argument may be made, however, that elimination of the state banking sys-
tems is beyond the constitutional power of the federal government. See Malloy, supra
note 22, at 211-23 (examining the effect of the Tenth Amendment on federal regulatory
authority in the banking field).
25. But see supra note 22 (discussing the convergence between federal and state bank-
ing regulations precipitated by federal legislation in recent years).
26. See generally Haley & Seligman, The Development of International Banking by the
United States, in The International Banking Handbook 35 (W.H. Baughn & D.R.
Mandich eds. 1983) (discussing the development of U.S. international banking).
27. See id.
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In the cruel logic of history, it was World War I and the postwar con-
ditions that gave the first significant impetus to the development of
American international banking. Because European exports were cur-
tailed during the war, United States exports began to fill the gap and
American banks began to follow their commercial customers all over the
globe. In the postwar period, of course, United States foreign trade con-
tinued to grow and with it United States involvement in international
banking.
The motive power of economic expansion, carrying banking with it
along the paths of trade, eventually stumbled on its own feverish success
in the postwar period of the 1920s. Overextension of credit, unbridled
and brutal trade competition, and finally the economic dislocation fol-
lowing from the market failure of 1929, triggered the collapse of the in-
ternational banking market. Worldwide depression and a second global
war completed the cycle, while also setting the conditions for a new di-
rection towards coordination and convergence.
Having experienced the potential advantages of global expansion as
well as the wasteland of the Great Depression and the Second World
War, the international community began a process of reflection and ne-
gotiation for a fundamental change in the character of the international
financial environment. This environment had proceeded from an ini-
tially fragmented and essentially ad hoc series of arrangements, through
the experience of a rapid and rabid process of expansion still grounded in
local and national interests, until it finally confronted the sharp and criti-
cal need for systemic coordination and convergence of national policies.
I offer three examples of contemporary responses to this critical need.
A. Creation of the International Monetary Fund
At the broadest systemic level, this need for convergence led to the
creation of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF'),2" which, in its
present form, is committed to a series of goals that are obviously linked
to the process of international coordination. The first of these goals in-
cludes the promotion of international monetary cooperation, "through a
permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and
collaboration on international monetary problems."29
28. For a brief description of the historical conditions and motivations that led to the
creation of the IMF, see The Role and Function of the International Monetary Fund 1-2
(1985) [hereinafter "IMF Role and Function"]; see also J.K. Horsefield, The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 1945-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Coopera-
tion (1969) (providing additional background information); Note, The World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund At the Forefront of World Transformation, in Annual
Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the
1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S349, S351-52 (1992) (same).
29. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. I,
(i), 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, as amended, 20 U.S.T. 2775,
T.I.A.S. No. 6748 (May 31, 1968), 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937 (April 30, 1976)
[hereinafter "IMF Articles"].
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Second, the IMF has a basic mandate for the facilitation of "the ex-
pansion and balanced growth of international trade,"3 by rationalizing
the financial environment in which international trade takes place.
Third, in support of this rationalization of the financial environment,
the IMF is devoted to the promotion of foreign exchange stability and to
the maintenance of "orderly exchange arrangements among [IMF] mem-
bers,"31 as well as to the avoidance of the sort of "beggar-thy-neighbor,"
destructively competitive exchange rate manipulation that was so com-
mon among states during the 1930s. Until the mid-1970s, this goal was
promoted by a system of fixed par values for IMF member currencies,
supervised by the IMF itself rather than by national regulators. This
fixed par value system eventually gave way, however, to a modified sys-
tem of floating exchange rates, coordinated and supervised by the IMF
under the Second Amendment of its charter, effective April 1, 1978. The
role of gold as an obligatory means of payment in transactions between
the IMF and its members was terminated, and the IMF Special Drawing
Right was given a greater role as the principal reserve asset of the inter-
national monetary system.
Fourth, the IMF has assisted in "the establishment of a multilateral
system of payments"32 among its members, and it has aided in the "elim-
ination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of
world trade." 33
Fifth, the IMF has the power to provide temporary financial assistance
to enable IMF members "to correct maladjustments in their balance of
payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or inter-
national prosperity."34 This power has, of course, become an increasing
focus of IMF activity in the face of the debt crisis experienced by devel-
oping countries since the beginning of the last decade.
Finally, in accordance with the goals already described, the IMF is
charged under its charter with the objective of ameliorating "dise-
quilibrium in the inter-nation balances of payments of [IMF]
members."35
Of course, it would be naive to imagine that the objectives of the IMF
have as yet been fully realized, or that they could ever be easily accom-
plished. The IMF itself has experienced institutional crisis, particularly
in the mid-1970s when its original system of par value exchange rates
was challenged and eventually dismantled in favor of the current man-
aged float system of exchange rates.36 Currently, the IMF is still con-
30. Id. art. I., I (ii).31. Id. art. I, I (iii).
32. Id. art. I, I (iv).
33. Id.
34. Id. art. I, 1 (v).
35. Id. art. I, (vi).
36. For a detailed discussion of this fundamental change, see J. Gold, The Second
Amendment of the Fund's Articles of Agreement (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 25, 1978).
See generally M. Garritsen de Vries, The International Monetary Fund, 1966-1971: The
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fronted with the dramatic challenge of the international debt crisis that
emerged in 1982,37 and it is newly confronted, along with the World
Bank, with the development challenges of Central and Eastern Europe.
What is significant for our purposes, however, is that the objectives of the
IMF are not merely the abstract, hortatory yearnings of a fragmented
international financial market, but rather are basic normative principles
of a binding juridical system that operates palpably and effectively in a
genuine international financial environment.
B. Internationalization of Financial Markets
The IMF is merely the clearest and most complete example of the pro-
cess of globalization of the financial environment. The character of indi-
vidual financial markets has today coalesced into an internationalized
financial market. The phenomenon of internationalization of the finan-
cial markets-and particularly of the securities markets-is becoming
more fully established, at an apparently increasing rate, as dramatic de-
velopments in the markets succeed one another.
The practical consequences of such developments, reflecting a trend
towards "internationalization," are significant. One need only examine
the almost choreographic precision with which the markets in major cen-
ters worldwide fell during the October 1987 "market correction" to ap-
preciate the implications of closely interrelated markets. The emerging
regulatory concerns are equally significant. Are disparate national regu-
latory systems capable of adequately monitoring transnational market
developments? Are these regulatory systems, with their differing require-
ments and objectives, inadvertently impeding the natural development of
orderly transnational markets? Is the apparently increasing volume of
transnational activity beyond the responsive capabilities of the national
regulatory systems?
Attempts at comprehending the contours of the phenomenon of inter-
nationalization, as well as the practical and regulatory implications of the
phenomenon, have already begun in earnest on many fronts. Certainly
one of the most noteworthy early efforts was the exhaustive 1987 study of
internationalization prepared by the staff of the Securities and Exchange
Commission." The SEC Staff Study appears to take the position that
"internationalization" is not a new phenomenon at all because, through-
out history, investors have assumed the risks of investing in foreign econ-
omies. According to the SEC study, "The degree to which the world's
securities markets have become internationalized, however, is unprece-
dented. These developments are a result both of technological advances
and of the removal of restrictions on foreign participation by many of the
System Under Stress (1976) (discussing the exchange rate crisis and the collapse of the
par value system); M. Garritsen de Vries, The International Monetary Fund, 1972-1978:
Cooperation on Trial (1985) (discussing reform towards a float system).
37. See IMF Role and Function, supra note 28, at 11-13.
38. See SEC Staff Study, supra note 1.
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world's securities markets. 39
One obvious model of an "internationalized securities market" would
appear to be the secondary trading market in Eurobonds, now of long
standing. Still, there remain many practical limitations on the emergence
of an integrated, truly internationalized market. For example, the lack of
international clearance and settlement links to facilitate cross-border
settlements, and the wide variance in clearance and settlement systems
within national markets, are still major impediments to
internationalization.
Nevertheless, even in its present state of development, notable features
of an "internationalized" market may be identified. Among other things,
the internationalized market is, or will be, marked by increased direct
competition among the participants in the world's national securities
markets. In addition, the significant growth in transactions by investors
outside their home country would appear to give some definition to the
emerging global character of the securities markets.
Furthermore, in the international distribution market, it appears that
mechanisms that have traditionally been utilized in debt offerings are be-
ginning to be mobilized for equity offerings as well. Clearly, transna-
tional markets are beginning to play a more significant role in
international capital formation.
In addition, deregulation-at least as to ease of entry into other na-
tional markets-would seem to presage an increase in direct worldwide
competition in equity securities. In fact, a corresponding development in
the secondary markets is already upon us. With the increase in multina-
tional stock listings and transnational trading in equity securities, there is
heightened interest among professionals in the development of a twenty-
four-hour global stock market.
These examples, then, are some of the potential characteristics of the
emerging trend towards internationalization. The challenge for the fu-
ture is thus: How will the current national regulatory systems respond to
this trend? At the very least, greater bilateral and regional cooperation
in regulatory efforts will be required.
C. Coordination at Regional Levels
Themes of coordination and convergence are already evident at the
regional level. Indeed, one can clearly observe an expanded framework
of regional cooperation underlying the process of globalization. The best
example of this is, of course, the creation of the European Community
("EC"). With the lowering of tariff barriers among the original six mem-
bers, transnational corporations reentered the market, and transnational
banks once again followed their customers into this market. This process
has continued with the expansion of EC membership.
39. Id. at I-1. Cf id. at 11-5 (noting relatively rapid growth of internationalization in
1980s).
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Another new challenge for globalized financial services may also be
presented by the promised integration of the EC as of December 31,
1992.4 Convergence of the financial services markets in the EC, how-
ever, will require the elimination of capital controls, the harmonization
of taxation, and the integration of regulatory systems. How realistic this
project will be remains to be seen. Mutual recognition of national super-
visory authorities within the EC, with principal supervision by the home-
state regulator, will result, at least in the near term, in regional coordina-
tion rather than complete convergence and centralization.4"
One other recent development at the regional level also illustrates the
theme of convergence in international banking. This is the emergence of
the framework regulating capital adequacy standards for international
banking enterprises, sponsored by a committee of the BIS.4 2 This coordi-
nated effort was explicitly intended to achieve a convergence of regula-
tory standards that should eliminate a situation of competitive
disadvantage, in which regulation of capital adequacy by home states has
been so varied as to place international banks on a markedly unlevel
playing field.43 The new framework is now in the process of implementa-
tion.' With little dissent or variation,4" the members of the G-10,46 plus
Switzerland and Luxembourg, have agreed to a convergent regime of
capital adequacy under which their banks will be required to maintain a
specified ratio of capital to assets.
By the end of 1992, this minimum required ratio will be eight percent,
of which half must be constituted of core elements of equity capital.47
The assets, which constitute the denominator of this ratio, will be ad-
justed to reflect their relative risk (and hence their need to be covered by
capital) by factors ranging from a zero-percent risk weight for cash and
cash-like assets, to a 100-percent risk weight for such assets as claims on
the private sector.4" In addition, off-balance-sheet items will also be in-
40. See Wegen, supra note 2, at S96-97 (discussing the 1992 project).
41. For a useful critique and assessment of the prospects for international banking in
the 1992 consolidation, see Weatherstone, An American View of Europe's Consolidation in
1992, Remarks before Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce (Zurich, 20 June 1988),
reprinted in Am. Banker, June 24, 1988, at 4.
42. For a discussion of the development of these risk-based capital adequacy stan-
dards, see Malloy, supra note 18, at 112-21.
43. See id, at 75, 78-80.
44. See Final Report for International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital Standards, reprinted in I Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 5403 (July 15, 1988)
[hereinafter "Final Report"].
45. See, eg., id at 3310 n.3 (argument of one member country that the international
definition of capital should be narrower than provided for in the report); id at 3314 n.4
(argument of one member country that a lower risk-weight should be applied to certain
categories of assets); id, at 3318 (discussing the discretion of national authorities adminis-
tering rules with respect to the calculation of potential future credit exposure of items
contingent on foreign exchange and interest rates).
46. See supra note 20 (describing the Group of 10).
47. See Final Report, supra note 44, at 3314.
48. See id at 3317.
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cluded in the denominator. These contingent items, however, will first be
adjusted through the application of appropriate "credit conversion fac-
tors," intended to account for the potential risk to a bank in carrying
such contingencies.49
The intended result of this new regime of capital regulation is that any
bank with a relatively riskier portfolio of assets and contingent items
would be required, under the prescribed ratio, to carry a higher amount
of capital to cushion against potential loss in the value of assets than
would any bank with relatively less risky assets and contingent items.
This would be so even though the amount of assets accounted for on
their balance sheets otherwise looked exactly the same.
The hope is that this convergence in the rules governing capital mea-
surement and capital standards for international banks will result in a
more accurate method of calculating relative assets risk, and in greater
safety and soundness for the banks supervised under this regime. The
degree of coordination among national supervisors, in such a technical
area of regulation, is in itself striking. It illustrates how far we have
come from the historical roots of bank regulation. Where there once was
fragmentation and destructive competitiveness in international bank-
ing-as reflected in the attitudes of the individual national authorities-
we now have a genuine concern with and practical movement towards
coordination and convergence. What may be equally significant for the
future is the fact that the BIS Committee has already circulated the final
report of its efforts "to supervisory authorities worldwide, with a view to
encouraging the adoption of this framework in countries outside the G-
10 in respect of banks conducting significant international business." 0
CONCLUSION: BUMPER CARS ON THE REBOUND?
It cannot have escaped notice that each of the three contemporary ex-
amples of the growing need for convergence in financial services regula-
tion remains mostly prospective rather than fully actualized. The first
example-the experience of the IMF 51-represents a fully converged
pattern of regulation,52 in which a field of regulation is occupied by an
international institution with full regulatory authority within its sphere
of concern.5 3
The second example-the internationalization of private financial mar-
kets54 -appears to be taking on the pattern of a series of bilateral accom-
modations," as is evident from recent SEC initiatives. 56 As this series
49. See id. at 3317-19.
50. Id. at 3309.
51. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 20-21, accompanying text, and Illustration 6.
53. See IMF Articles, supra note 29, at art. XXIX (interpretation of terms exclusively
a power of IMF Executive Board and Board of Governors).
54. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 18-19, accompanying text, and Illustration 5.
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proliferates, and as awareness of the need for coordination becomes
clearer among national regulators, we may expect to see something like a
converged pattern of regulation,5" held together by a "weak force" of
overlapping bilateral commitments.58 By contrast, at least on a regional
level, the converged pattern of regulation is being achieved in the field of
securities regulation within the European Community," held together by
a "strong force" of coordinated regulation.
The third example-multilateral banking regulation of capital assess-
ment and capital standards°-represents another converged pattern of
regulation held together by a "weak force" of individual national under-
takings. Here again, this pattern may be contrasted with the "strong
force" converged pattern of European Community initiatives to develop
generally applicable rules in the field of bank regulation.6
Certainly, as internationalization continues, the SEC and other na-
tional regulators will confront new challenges to effectively regulate of
the markets.62 The models of regulation available offer a range of possi-
ble responses. Regionalized solutions, or the subfield convergence of reg-
ulatory patterns held together by the weak force of individual national
adherence to multilateral or bilateral principles of regulation, have been
the primary resort. While that dynamic remains the dominant pattern of
regulation, the theme of convergence will continue to be prospective, and
possibly merely a hope.
One test of wills may emerge in the area of the implementation of the
BIS capital adequacy guidelines.63 Another such test may emerge in the
implementation of the Second Banking Directive in the EC.6' Successful
implementation and enforcement of these two initiatives, and their ac-
ceptance generally as working models of international regulation, may
provide the basis for the future development of a "strong force" con-
verged pattern of regulation. 65 Failure to move these developments in
56. See Doty, supra note 13, at S77-90.
57. See supra notes 20-21, accompanying text, and Illustration 6.
58. See Henriques, Regulators Add to Ties Abroad, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1991, at DI,
col. 5 (discussing recent bilateral agreements between the SEC and the EC Commission,
the United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden with respect to securities enforcement).
59. See Wegen, supra note 2, at S92-93.
60. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
61. See Wegen, supra note 2, at S93.
62. See Lohr, At the End of a Twisted Trail, Piggy Bank for a Favored Few, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 12, 1991, at Al, col. 1 (analyzing the international fraud behind the failure of
the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)); see also Note, Putting the
Super Back in the Supervision of International Banking Post-BCCI, in Annual Survey of
Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60
Fordham L. Rev. S467, S479-89 (1992) (discussing the BCCI scandal and the need for
cooperative international regulation).
63. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text; see also Wegen, supra note 2, at
S93 (discussing the Second Banking Directive).
65. Cf supra text accompanying note 50 (BIS report distributed to other national
regulators).
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this direction may leave us with a stultifying pattern of subfield consoli-
dation66 in which larger, but still uncoordinated, regionalized bumper
cars will carom around the internationalized arena of financial services.
66. See supra notes 16-17, accompanying text, and Illustration 4.
